Thursday, March 21, 2013

Why Not a Quantitative Target for Quantitative Easing?


March 20, 2013

Why Not a Quantitative Target for Quantitative Easing?

When I should have been practicing my bass guitar in preparation for my band class Thursday evening, I, instead, watched the first few minutes of Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke’s post-FOMC press conference. A number of press inquiries were related to adding specificity to the FOMC’s criteria for modifying its current $85 billion per-month purchases of securities. In the short time that I watched the press conference, Chairman Bernanke did not seem to satisfy the press on this issue. So, again, neglecting my bass guitar practice, to which I assure you, I should not neglect, I decided to write this commentary on how I would determine the management of a quantitative approach to monetary policy. I have no illusions that Chairman Bernanke will follow my suggestion. But I believe that by observing what the Fed actually does compared to my suggestion, investors can gain some valuable information as to the cyclical behavior of the economy and the cyclical behavior of riskier assets vs. less risky assets.

So, as Fareed Zakaria says on Sunday mornings, let’s get started. Plotted in Chart 1 is the relationship between the year-over-year percent change in nominal gross domestic purchases (not product) and the year-over-year percent change in total thin-air credit. If the chart looks familiar, it is an updated version of the Chart 1 I included in my February 5, 2013 tome, “The 2013 Economic Outlook – Bright Sunshine for the U.S., Periods of Cloud Abroad”. To refresh your memory, total thin-air credit is the sum of the credit extended by the Federal Reserve and the depository institution system, the latter of which is dominated by the commercial banking system. I refer to this credit as thin-air credit because it is credit that figuratively is created out of thin air, which enables its recipients to increase their current spending on goods/ services/ assets whilst not requiring its grantors or any other entity to cut back on their current spending. Hence, changes in thin-air credit, theoretically, should correlate highly with changes in total nominal spending in an economy. And this might be one of those rare cases where “ugly” facts do not spoil a “beautiful” theory. That is, from 1953 through 2007, the correlation between percent changes in total thin-air credit and percent changes in nominal gross domestic purchases – the aggregate nominal spending in the U.S. on currently-produced goods and services, be they goods and services produced in the U.S. or China, is 0.65 out of a possible maximum of 1.00. Why did I stop the correlation calculation at the end of 2007 rather than calculating it with data through the end of 2012? Because the correlation value would have fallen, detracting from my “beautiful” theory. Why would the correlation value have fallen? Because right after Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008, the Fed increased its balance sheet enormously, in part with loans to AIG and to foreign central banks, which also enlarged total thin-air credit. But because these Fed loans to AIG were, in effect, restoring some of AIG’s “depreciated” capital and because there were Fed loans of large dollar amounts to foreign central banks,  the increase in Fed loans and the resulting increase in total thin-air credit had no positive impact on domestic spending.


Chart 1


Why isn’t the correlation 1.00 between 1953 and 2007? Primarily because some of the spending by the recipients of thin-air credit is on previously-produced goods and services, e.g., used cars, used homes or, in my case, used sailboats, or spending on financial assets. So, if the Fed wanted to conduct monetary policy in a way that would result in some steady rate of growth in aggregate nominal domestic demand, post-WWII economic history suggests it could do worse than managing the amount of credit it extends so as to hit a target rate of growth in the sum of credit it extends and the credit banks and other depository institutions extend. Assume that the Fed believed that if the economy were operating at full employment, then annual growth in nominal gross domestic purchases of around 4% would maintain full employment, would keep consumer-price inflation around 2% annually and would prevent the inflation of asset-price bubbles. Further assume that, for whatever reason, credit being extended by depository institutions was only growing at 2% annually. Under the Paul Kasriel recommendation to Chairman Bernanke, the Fed would undertake the expansion of its balance sheet, primarily through the acquisition of securities from the market, such that the sum of Fed credit and depository institution credit was boosted to an annual rate of growth of 4%. Now assume, that the growth in depository institution credit accelerates from 2% annualized to 4%, which then results in the sum of Fed and depository institution credit now growing at 6% annualized. This would be a signal to the Fed to cut back on its purchases of securities such that the sum of Fed and depository institution credit slows in growth back down to a rate of 4% annualized.

How has the Fed managed its securities purchases in recent years compared with the Paul Kasriel approach? The Fed’s first conscious decision to concentrate on a quantity of securities purchases commenced in December 2008. This first securities-purchase program, which became known as quantitative easing (QE), lasted through the middle of third quarter of 2010. During this period, the Fed purchased approximately $1.725 trillion of various types and maturities of securities from the market. Shown in Chart 2 is the behavior of depository institution credit and total thin-air credit. Throughout most of this first securities- purchase program by the Fed, represented by the yellow shaded area QE I in Chart 2, depository institution credit was contracting. Early in the QE I period, there was unusually high growth in total thin-air credit due primarily due to massive extensions of Fed credit through various lending facilities such as the discount window, loans to foreign central banks and loans to AIG. Notice, however, by the fourth quarter of 2009, despite continued Fed securities purchases, total thin-air credit was contracting. The reasons for this contraction in total thin-air credit were the contraction in depository institution credit and the reduction in Fed credit through the Fed’s various lending facilities.

Chart 2



Also shown in Chart 2 for illustrative purposes is a series I have named Total Thin-Air Credit “Target”. I have defined the target rate of growth in total thin-air credit as the year-over-year percent change in CBO-estimated real potential GDP plus 2 percentage points. Presumably, once full employment in the economy were achieved, the Fed would desire that nominal GDP grow somewhere in the neighborhood of the rate of growth in real potential GDP with an annual inflation rate of 2 percent. The best and the brightest economists at the Fed could work out what the rate of growth in total thin-air credit would need to be in order to hit this nominal GDP growth target. Given that the 0.65 correlation between growth in total thin-air credit and nominal gross domestic purchases, I would assume that the target rate of growth in total thin-air credit as I have defined it would be a minimum target. Back to QE I. Starting in the third quarter of 2009 and for the remainder of the QE I period, growth in actual total thin-air credit was below my illustrative target rate of growth.

Now, on to QE II. This second round of securities purchases undertaken by the Fed started in the middle of the fourth quarter of 2010 and terminated at the end of the second quarter of 2011. The Fed purchased an additional $600 billion of securities during QE II. Given that other asset items on the Fed’s balance sheet were relatively constant during QE II and that the contraction in depository institution credit was of a smaller magnitude than it was during QE I, total thin-air credit grew throughout QE II and reached my illustrative target rate of growth by the end of
QE II.

Due to the resumption in growth of depository institution credit in the fourth quarter of 2011, total thin-air credit exceeded my illustrative target rate by about 1.6 percentage points. Thereafter, however, growth in total thin-air credit again dipped below my illustrative target rate, being about one percentage point below the target growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2012, the first full quarter of QE III.

The Fed will not release its first quarter 2013 flow-of-funds report, the source of total depository institution credit data, until June 6. But the Fed does release monthly bank credit data. Given that commercial bank credit now accounts for the bulk of depository institution credit, year-over-year percent changes in monthly bank credit are a close approximation for year-over-year percent changes in depository institution credit. Therefore, the year-over-year percent change in the sum of monthly bank credit and monthly Fed credit is a close approximation for the year-over-year percent changes in total thin-air credit. Year-over-year percent changes in monthly bank credit and the sum of bank and Fed credit are shown in Chart 3 through February 2013, the latest complete monthly data available. Also shown in Chart 3 is the illustrative target rate of growth for total thin-air credit. While year-over-year growth in bank credit is slowing, growth in the sum of bank and Fed credit is accelerating because of the resumption of Fed net asset purchases that commenced in mid September of 2012. In February 2013, year-over-year growth in the sum of Fed and bank credit had reached the illustrative target rate of growth of 3.8%.

Chart 3




Before we should hoist the “Mission Accomplished” banner for the Fed, we need to take into consideration that my illustrative target rate of growth for total thin-air credit is what the target the Fed might aim for as full employment is approached. No serious person, even the perennial FOMC hawks, would consider our current unemployment rate of 7.7% as anywhere close to full employment. Consider also that from 1953 through 2012, the median year-over-year growth in total thin-air credit was 7.25%. Acknowledging that 7.25% annual growth in thin-air credit was associated with some economic booms, still, with as much excess capacity that currently exists in the U.S. economy, 3.8% growth in total thin-air credit would appear to be rather anemic compared to this median rate of growth in total thin air credit.
But by this time in 2014, the situation could be much different. If the Fed were to hold to its current course of increasing its balance sheet by about $85 billion per month throughout 2013, this would represent a 7.1% increase in total thin-air credit in the fourth quarter of 2013 vs. 2012 assuming depository institution credit remained constant at its fourth-quarter 2012 level. Given that the capital positions of depository institutions in general are much improved, it is much more probable that depository institution credit will be rising in 2013 rather than remaining stagnant. Thus, unless the Fed soon cuts back on its securities purchases, growth in total thin-air credit is likely to be robust in 2013, which implies relatively robust growth in aggregate domestic spending on goods, services and assets.

I don’t expect the Fed to pay any heed to this commentary. But you might want to. If total thin-air credit continues to accelerate this year, it will be bullish for growth in U.S. economic activity and bullish for risk assets. If, by the end of 2013 or sooner, total thin-air credit is growing on a year-over-year basis at 7% or more, be prepared for U.S. bond yields of all stripes to have risen significantly in anticipation of Fed interest rate hikes well before 2015, when the majority of FOMC members now believe rate increases will commence.

Paul L. Kasriel
Senior Economic and Investment Adviser, Legacy Private Trust Co.
Econtrarian, LLC
http://www.the-econtrarian.blogspot.com/
Econtrarian@gmail.com
1-920-818-0236

Monday, March 18, 2013

The Real Economic Implications of Our Senior Entitlements Challenge


March 18, 2013
The Real Economic Implications of Our Senior Entitlements Challenge

Economics is art masquerading as science. Demographics is not only science, but destiny. Chart 1 shows the changing demographics of America. It shows the rising trend in the proportion of senior “takers” in America. Back in 1960, those U.S. residents aged 65 or over made up 9.2% of the total population. That percentage had risen to 13.1% by 2010 and is projected to move up rapidly in the coming decades, reaching 21.9% by 2060. I refer to this (my) age cohort as “takers” because most Americans in this age group retire from the workforce – stop “making” – and primarily just “take” or consume. The preparation, or lack thereof, for this significant increase in senior “takers” has important implications for the future long-term potential per capita growth of the U.S. economy.

Chart 1


My perception is that this changing demographic phenomenon is being discussed in the mainstream media primarily in terms of its impact on federal government spending. Indeed, the projected increase in the number of U.S. seniors will have important implications for federal government spending, more so on the composition of total spending than the growth in total spending. Chart 2 shows actual and CBO- baseline projected fiscal year-over-year percent changes in total federal government outlays from 1974 through 2023. Also shown in Chart 2 are the actual and CBO-baseline projected federal expenditures on senior entitlements – Social Security and Medicare – as a percentage of total federal outlays for the fiscal years 1973 through 2023. The senior entitlement spending is understated because it does not include Medicaid expenditures for senior nursing home care.



Chart 2


The projected median annual growth in total federal outlays in the fiscal years 2013 through 2023 is 5.5%. This is lower than the 6.1% annual median growth in total federal outlays in the fiscal years 1974 through 2012. So, projected growth in total federal outlays in an environment of a rising proportion of U.S. seniors is not extraordinary. As an aside, average annual growth in total federal outlays in the three fiscal years ended 2012 was 0.2%. So, the perception that federal government spending currently is excessive may hold for the absolute level, but not for its rate of growth in the past three fiscal years. But let us never allow facts to get in the way of opinions.

What is more noteworthy in Chart 2 than the projected annual rates of growth in total federal government spending is the rising percentage of that spending dedicated to senior entitlements. In fiscal year 1973, senior entitlements accounted for 24.4% of total federal outlays. By fiscal year 2012, this percentage had risen to 37.3% and is now projected by the CBO to rise further to 42.1% by fiscal year 2023. Assuming that there is a desire by the body politic to limit growth in total federal outlays, federal senior entitlement spending inexorably is “crowding out” other categories of federal government expenditures, for example, infrastructure, education and scientific research.  Now we are getting to the implication for future per capita economic growth as a result of the aging of America. To the degree that federal government spending on infrastructure, education and scientific research enhances productivity growth – and, to be sure, there is much disagreement as to this degree – then the crowding out of this federal spending by increased senior entitlement spending implies slower future per-capita growth in the U.S. economy.

Assuming it were politically feasible, could we mitigate the negative effect on future per capita economic growth emanating from increased federal spending on senior entitlements by simply cutting back on these entitlements? This would not change the demographic trend. There still will be millions of baby boomers moving into their mid to late 60s in the next 20 years. If their federal entitlements were curtailed, some baby boomers might try to delay their transition from “makers” to “takers”. [With apologies to Ms. Hortense Mintz, who drilled me and attempted to skill me in the writing of the English language at Manhattan Elementary School in Tampa, Florida, I am adopting the British convention regarding the placement of punctuation in relation to quotation marks because it seems more logical to me.] Others, who already have become “takers”, might transition back to “makers”.  But this is unlikely  to materially affect the large number of U.S. residents exiting the labor force because of age. So, there still is going to be a significant increase in the number of Americans, due to aging, consuming without producing in the next 20 years. If the federal government does not transfer funds from the cohort of “makers” to these senior “takers”, then the children of the senior “takers” or charities will provide funds to help feed, house, clothe and medicate them (me). This certainly would reduce the amount that senior “takers” consume, especially on discretionary goods and services, compared to what would have occurred if the government had not cut back on senior entitlements. For example, if Carnival Cruise Lines has problems now with its equipment breakdowns, just wait until senior “takers” ask their children for some extra cash so that they can take that winter Caribbean voyage! Regardless of who writes the check, in the next 20 years, there is going to be a substantial increase in the number of Americans who are consuming without producing. This is going to divert resources away from productivity enhancing uses, such as investment in physical and human capital. This, in turn, implies slower future real per-capita economic growth.

This slower future real per-capita economic growth that I expect was not inevitable had we saved for this demographic event. Had the private sector saved more, then the capital stock, both physical as well as human, would have grown faster. In turn, this would have enhanced future productivity growth and, thus, future real per capita economic growth. The advent of Social Security in 1935 and Medicare in 1965 created disincentives for American households to save for their consumption in retirement. Why should households save as much for their retirement when the government has promised to supplement their effective retirement income? If the government is going to supplement retiree income, then it is incumbent on the government to save more in anticipation of this. Had the government saved more, i.e., run surpluses or smaller deficits, this would have left more resources for use in building up the stock of physical and human capital. Had the nation as a whole saved more, then the U.S. economy might have been running trade surpluses with the rest of the world rather than persistent trade deficits. Cumulative trade surpluses would have allowed us to import more goods and services as “makers” transitioned into “takers”, permitting us to continue building up our capital stock so that future “makers” would be more productive. But, alas, as shown in Chart 3, the saving of combined government entities in the U.S. has been trending lower relative to GDP throughout the post-WWII era. Private saving relative to GDP has been trending lower since the mid 1980s. It is ironic that total net national saving as a percent of GDP peaked in 1965, the year in which the Medicare entitlement was signed into law.



Chart 3


 In sum, because we did not increase our aggregate saving in anticipation of the significant rise in the proportion of senior “takers” , real per capita economic growth in this country is likely to be adversely affected in the next 20 years. This does not mean that growth in our aggregate standard of living will be stagnant. But it does suggest that our per capita standard of living will grow slower than it has in most of the post-WWII era. Even if it were politically feasible to pare back entitlements to current senior recipients, this would have only marginal salutatory effects on the economy’s per capita real growth in the next two decades. Similar to the estimated 11 million undocumented “makers”, we baby-boom “takers” are here and we are not going away, voluntarily, at least. One way or another, we are going to eat and get medical care, which is going to use resources that otherwise could have been used to enhance the productivity of current and future “makers”.  There is no use crying over spilled milk. But we can take steps individually and, dare I say, collectively, to lower the probabilities of “spilling milk” for future generations. Those of us senior “takers” who are fortunate enough not to be destitute without our entitlements could voluntarily set up educational trust funds at Legacy Private Trust Company of Neenah, Wisconsin for our grandchildren, funding these trusts with our Social Security checks and/or with the funds we otherwise would have spent dining out or taking that annual Carnival Cruise. I have not looked at the data, but I doubt that there are enough senior “takers” in this financial position to make a significant impact in the aggregate. But for those that can set up these trusts, when you rest in peace you can also rest assured that your grandchildren will reflect fondly on you. Collectively, we can encourage our elected officials to enact policies that promote increased saving – both private and public – so that future generations of senior “takers” do not adversely affect growth in real per capita income when they transition from “makers”. Good luck with that!

Paul L. Kasriel
Senior Economic and Invest Adviser to Legacy Private Trust Company
Econtrarian, LLC
1-920-818-0236



Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Sequestration Will Slow Real GDP Growth – But Not Because of Demand-­‐Side Effects


February 19, 2013
Sequestration Will Slow Real GDP Growth – But Not Because of Demand-­‐Side Effects

In my February 5, 2013 commentary “2013 Economic Outlook – Bright Sunshine for the U.S., Some Cloud Abroad,” I argued that changes in federal fiscal policy have no material impact on total spending on the economy, but rather affect the distribution or composition of a given amount of total spending. The crux of my argument was that other private spending would “crowd in/out” changes in demand emanating from changes in tax and/or government spending policies. In this commentary, I will amend that argument. A change in government spending will affect total real spending in the economy to the extent that this government spending represents a good or service that enhances commerce and is not being provided by the private sector. That is, to the degree that a government-­‐supplied good or service affects the economy’s potential to produce goods and services, changes in the provision of these government-­‐supplied goods and services will affect the economy’s real output. In these cases, changes in government spending will affect real economic growth from the supply side, not, as mainstream economists would have you believe, from the demand side. Some of the cuts in federal spending that are scheduled to take effect on March 1 in connection with sequestration fall into this category of affecting the supply side of the economy.
Before the adoption of satellite navigation systems, lighthouses played an important role in enhancing marine shipping and travel. Without lighthouses, there would have been more ships foundering on coasts, which would have depressed real output. So, if there had been a sequestration a century ago that necessitated the closure of some lighthouses, U.S. commerce and, thus, real output, would have suffered. Similarly, if sequestration occurs on March 1, our air transportation system will be adversely affected primarily by the reduction in air traffic controllers and secondarily by the reduction in TSA agents. Fewer air traffic controllers imply a reduction in flights, both passenger and freight. Fewer air traffic controllers imply longer tarmac delays for the flights that actually do occur. Fewer TSA agents would likely imply longer wait times in airport security lines. This reduction in air transportation will slow the wheels of commerce, i.e., slow real GDP growth. Creating more “thin-­‐air” credit on the part of the Federal Reserve will increase the demand for goods and services, including the demand for air transportation, but increased “thin-­‐air” credit will do nothing to increase the supply of air transportation and real GDP growth. Rather, an increase in “thin-­‐air” credit in the face of a reduced ability for the economy to grow in real terms will lead to higher inflation.
Sequestration will reduce the number of federal food inspectors. This will reduce the availability of certain food products at grocery stores and restaurants. Again, real GDP growth will slow because of supply-­‐side factors, not because of reduced demand.
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Sequestration obviously would cut federal government spending on many other programs than just air traffic control and food inspection. Head Start programs will be cut. Pre-­‐natal nutrition programs will be cut. And the list goes on. Although the services provided by these programs might affect the economy’s potential to produce real goods and services 15 or 20 years from now, it is doubtful that the reduction in these programs would have an immediate negative supply-­‐side effect on the economy. Rather, these and many other programs tend to merely redistribute a given amount of aggregate spending demand in the near term. Thus, reductions in federal government spending on these types of programs unlikely would have a negative affect total spending in the economy after a quarter or two. Private sector spending would likely “crowd in” the spending vacuum left by the reduction in government spending. So, by simplistically subtracting the amount of federal spending being cut on these programs from GDP to get a forecast of the negative impact of sequestration on GDP growth is wrong and exaggerated.
In sum, if sequestration does occur on March 1 and persists for several quarters, real GDP growth will be adversely affected. But the reason for the adverse effect on real GDP is much different than what mainstream economists are arguing. And because the reason is different, the estimates being provided by mainstream economists on the adverse effect of sequestration on GDP growth are incorrect and exaggerated.
Paul L. Kasriel
Econtrarian, LLC
econtrarian@gmail.com
1-­‐920-­‐818-­‐0236
http://www.the-­‐econtrarian.blogspot.com 

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

The 2013 Economic Outlook -- Bright Sunshine for the U.S., Periods of Cloud Abroad


February 5, 2013
The 2013 Economic Outlook – Bright Sunshine for the U.S., Periods of Cloud Abroad
Warning: Do not attempt reading the entirety of this commentary without the aid of your stimulant of choice. I apologize for the length of the commentary, but believed it necessary in order to inform new readers of my basic approach to macroeconomics. In future shorter (I promise) commentaries, there likely will be references to this one.

 According to preliminary data, the U.S. economy’s growth in price-adjusted terms was 1.5% in 2012 on a Q4/Q4 basis. As things now stand, I believe that this pace will easily be exceeded in 2013. U.S domestic demand can be expected to accelerate. In addition, foreign demand for U.S. goods and services likely will be stronger. For financial markets, the implications of these expectations are that risk assets will outperform riskless ones and that the yield curve will steepen as the interest rates on longer-maturity fixed-income securities rise as the interest rates on shorter-maturity fixed-income securities remain anchored near their current levels by an unchanged Federal Reserve policy.
Let’s begin by discussing the principal driver of domestic demand – credit creation. It is important to understand that not all credit is created equal. Some credit is created figuratively out of “thin air.” An important implication of thin-air credit is that while its recipients (i.e., borrowers) will be able to increase their current spending, the grantors (i.e., lenders) of thin-air credit are under no compulsion to decrease their current spending. Hence, an increase in thin-air credit implies a net increase in nominal spending. The entities that are able to create credit out of thin air are central banks (i.e., the Federal Reserve in the U.S.) and the private depository institution system. Private depository institutions include commercial banks, savings banks and credit unions. 
Before discussing the other broad category of credit, credit that is not created out of thin air, let’s describe how central banks and depository institution systems are able to create credit out of thin air. When a central bank purchases a security, it pays for that security by simply crediting the security seller’s bank account with an amount of “money” equal to the purchase price of the security. That increased amount of money the security seller now has was not transferred from some other entity’s bank account. Rather, it just “appeared” like manna from Heaven. The seller of the security to the central bank typically would replace the sold security with another security/loan, purchasing/funding the new security/loan with the manna from Heaven received from the central bank. Thus, indirectly, the central bank would have created new credit for the economy figuratively out of thin air. Even if not by law, by principle a central bank could grant a private entity a loan for the purchase of say, a house. This increase in credit would be created out of thin air.
In most financial systems, such as that of the U.S., depository institutions are required by law to hold only a fraction of the amount of the deposits on their books in the form of cash. Assume that depository institutions are required to hold at least 10% of their deposits as cash. (They would not be prohibited from holding an amount of cash greater than what is required by law if they so desired.) Let’s further assume that the depository institution system is made up of only one such institution, call it Jamie P. Morgan Bank (JPMB). If the central bank purchases $100 of securities from JPMB, recorded on the asset side of the balance sheet of JPMB and, thus, the depository institution system are a $100 decline in securities and a $100 increase in cash (technically, a $100 increase in JPMB’s deposit balances at the central bank). Under most circumstances, JPMB will want to replace the $100 of securities it sold to the central bank with another security or loan in an amount of $100. If it does so, there will be a net increase in credit to economy of $100. (The $100 of securities JPMB sold to the central bank represented credit that had previously been created. This credit was not extinguished when JPMB sold it to the central bank. Rather, the creditor changed from JPMB to the central bank.) Regardless of whether JPMB purchased a security or made a loan of $100, its deposits and, therefore, the deposits of the depository institution system, will have increased by $100. JPMB would then see its required cash “reserves” increase by $10, 10% of the $100 increase in deposits. Where would JPMB get the cash to meet its new higher required cash holdings? Well, because JPMB is the only depository institution in the system, the $100 it spent to purchase the security or make the loan comes right back to it in the form of the $100 deposit. Even though JPMB is required to hold an additional $10 in the form of cash, it still has $90 left that it could use to purchase another security or make another loan if it were profitable for it to do so. Assuming it is profitable to do, JPMB adds another $90 dollars of earning assets (loans and/or securities) to its balance sheet, which means that a total of $190 of net new credit has been created for the economy. Assuming it remained profitable and JPMB had the capital to support it, this process of credit creation could continue until a total of $1,000 ($100/0.1) of net new credit was added to the economy. So, by the central bank creating out of thin air $100 of “seed” money to the depository institution system, ultimately $1,000 of new credit potentially could have been created out of thin air for the economy. (It should be noted that if JPMB had some competitors, i.e., if there were some other depository institutions in the system, JPMB or its competitors would not be able to create new credit out of thin air individually because there is no guarantee that the funds created by an individual institution’s acquisition of a new earning asset would necessarily come back to that institution as a deposit. The funds could end up as a deposit at some other institution. But, the funds would remain in the depositary system as a whole and, therefore, the depositary system could potentially multiply $100 of seed money from the central bank into $1,000 of new credit for the economy created out of thin air.)
Now let’s distinguish between credit created out of thin air and credit created the old-fashioned way – through saving. Credit created through saving is not an impetus to the aggregate demand for goods/services/assets in the economy. Rather, credit created from saving transfers spending power from the grantor of this credit to the recipient. For example, households can increase their net provision of credit. They typically do this by curtailing their current spending and lending the funds that they otherwise would have spent to a borrower, perhaps a business or a government, that has a greater urgency to spend today than do households. Unlike central banks and depository institution systems, households and other nonfinancial entities are not generally capable of creating credit out of thin air. There is one scenario, however, whereby households and other nonfinancial entities could extend new credit that would result in a net increase in spending in the economy. This scenario would entail households funding their new lending, not by increasing their saving, i.e., not by curtailing their current spending, but by running down their deposits. If households are willing to hold fewer deposits than otherwise by substituting loan/securities /liabilities of financial intermediaries for these deposits, then the recipients of this credit extended directly from households or indirectly from households via financial intermediaries would increase their current spending and households need not, under these circumstances, curtail their current spending. Hence, in this special case, there would result a net increase in spending from the increase in credit even though this credit was not created by the central bank or the depository institution system. 
So, let’s look at the historical relationship between changes in different categories of credit and changes in aggregate domestic spending on currently-produced goods and services in the U.S. economy. Plotted in Chart 1 are the year-over-year percentages changes in quarterly observations of combined Federal Reserve and depository institution credit (total “thin-air” credit) along with the year-over-year percentage changes in quarterly observations of nominal domestic purchases of currently-produced goods and services. Some of these goods and services were not produced in the U.S. but were imported.  From Q1:1953 through Q4:2007, the correlation between percentage changes in total thin-air credit and percentage changes in nominal gross domestic purchases is 0.65 out of maximum possible 1.00. By “eyeballing” the chart, one can see that generally changes in total thin-air credit correspond closely with changes in nominal domestic purchases in the same direction from 1953 through 2007. This high positive correlation between changes in total thin-air credit and changes in nominal domestic purchases is what would be expected from the prior explanation. An increase in thin-air credit allows the recipients to increase their current spending while not requiring the grantors of this credit to curtail their current spending. Hence, an increase in thin-air credit carries with it a presumption that there will be an increase in domestic spending. 
Chart 1

This positive relationship, however, went awry in 2008. In that year, total thin-air credit growth skyrocketed as the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet expanded in reaction to the financial crisis and nominal domestic purchases contracted by the most since the post-WWII era. The principal reason the positive relationship between changes in thin-air credit and changes in nominal domestic spending turned negative in 2008 is that a large part of the expansion in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet was loans to foreign central banks, who, in turn, extended U.S. dollar-denominated funding credit to their constituent banks who were facing a U.S. dollar liquidity squeeze. Thin-air credit extended to a foreign central bank would not be expected to result in an increase in U.S domestic purchases.  Subsequent to the unusual events in 2008, the positive relationship between changes in total thin-air credit and changes in nominal domestic purchases has re-established itself.
Now, let’s look at the historical relationship between percentage changes in credit extended by nonfinancial entities (e.g., households, nonfinancial businesses, governments, the rest of the world) and percentage changes in nominal gross domestic purchases, as shown in Chart 2. From Q1:1953 through Q4:2007, the correlation between these two series is 0.39 vs. 0.65 for total thin-air credit changes.  Given that the bulk of credit extended by nonfinancial entities is funded by these entities curtailing their current spending, i.e., increasing their saving, this category of credit extension tends just  to redistribute a given amount of spending rather than resulting in a net increase in spending.  Thus, it would not be expected that there would be a close positive relationship between changes in credit extended by nonfinancial entities and changes in nominal domestic purchases.
Chart 2


Lastly, let’s look at the historical relationship between percentage changes in credit extended by financial intermediaries other than depository institutions (e.g., insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds) and percentage changes in nominal gross domestic purchases, as shown in Chart 3. From Q1:1953 through Q4:2007, the correlation between these two series is 0.28 vs. 0.65 for total thin-air credit changes.  Again, it would not be expected that there would be a close positive relationship between changes in credit issued by non-depository financial intermediaries and changes in nominal domestic purchases unless the ultimate providers of this credit, nonfinancial entities, were willing to substitute the liabilities of these non-depository financial intermediaries for their holdings of deposits, i.e., the liabilities of depository institutions. 



Chart 3




So, let’s summarize what has been discussed so far. There are two broad categories of credit – credit that is created figuratively out of thin air and credit that transfers spending power from the grantor to the recipient. An increase in credit created out of thin air would be expected to result in a net increase in nominal spending on goods/service/assets. An increase in credit transferred from one entity to another would not be expected to result in a net increase in nominal spending on goods/service/assets, but rather just to redistribute a given amount of nominal spending.

Now that we understand that the behavior of thin-air credit plays a key role in the behavior of domestic spending in an economy, let’s discuss the recent and near-term expected behavior of thin-air credit in the U.S. This is shown in Chart 4. In the three months ended December 2012, there was an acceleration in the growth of combined Federal Reserve and commercial bank thin-air credit to an annualized rate of 3.4%. Both components of this thin-air credit aggregate contributed to this accelerated growth. In the latter part of 2012, the Federal Reserve announced that it would begin increasing its securities holdings by a net $85 billion per month for an undetermined time. Assuming other asset items on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet were to remain relatively constant, this would imply an annual increase in the thin-air credit created by the Fed of $1.02 trillion. If this pace were maintained in 2013, it would represent an annual rate of increase in Federal Reserve created thin-air credit in excess of 35%. If commercial bank credit were to remain at its December 2012 level throughout 2013 and if the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet were to increase a net $1.02 trillion in the 12 months ended December 2013, then the 2013 December-over-December change in the sum of Federal Reserve and commercial bank credit would be 8.0%. To put this 8.0% year-over-year change in perspective, the median year-over-year change in this credit aggregate from December 1991 through December 2012 was 6.77%. So, what the Federal Reserve is doing with regard to increasing the size of its balance sheet – creating credit out of thin air – is likely to stimulate U.S. domestic spending quite significantly.

From examining Chart 4, we can see that this would not the first time in recent years in which the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet grew rapidly. For example, there was a spike in the3-month growth of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet in the first half of 2011, only to see this growth dissipate in the second half of 2011. What might be different this time? The Federal Reserve recently announced more specific observable goals for its policy actions. The Federal Reserve has indicated that it does not intend to raise its policy interest rates until the unemployment rate, which stood at 7.9% in January, falls to 6.5% or unless the consumer inflation rate, which was 1.3% year-over-year in December, is projected to rise above 2.5% in the next one to two years. The Federal Reserve did not announce the same conditions for terminating its current pace of balance-sheet expansion, but one could infer that this round of Federal Reserve balance-sheet expansion is more economic-goal dependent than time/amount dependent, as was the case in recent years. So, I expect that the Federal Reserve’s current pace of net securities acquisitions of $85 billion per month will persist throughout most of 2013, if not all.

Chart 4



The Federal Reserve currently accounts for only about 20% of total thin-air credit. By far, the biggest component of total thin-air credit is commercial banking system credit. As shown in Chart 4, bank credit resumed steady, albeit historically weak, growth around mid 2011. In the three months ended December 2012, bank credit growth re-accelerated to 3.75% annualized. I expect that bank credit growth will accelerate further throughout 2013 as banks become more willing to extend new credit. But even if commercial bank credit were to grow at an annualized rate of 3.75% for all of 2013, along with the stepped up growth in Federal Reserve credit, as discussed above, growth in the sum of Federal Reserve and commercial bank credit is likely to be quite strong in 2013, which implies strong growth in domestic purchases of goods/service/assets.

There is a common view that bank credit growth has remained historically weak in recent years because of lack of demand for credit. I reject this view. Rather, I believe that banks have been reluctant to accommodate the demand for credit because of current or expected capital constraints. Banks need adequate capital to expand the amount of assets on their balance sheets. In 2009, after the worst financial crisis in the U.S. since the early 1930s, the U.S banking system experienced a crippling “evaporation” of capital. After that, regulatory authorities indicated that required capital ratios for banks would be rising by a to-be-determined amount. Even if banks currently had adequate capital to resume lending, some were uncertain about their future capital adequacy due to continued declines in real estate prices, both residential as well as commercial, and by the uncertainty as to what regulatory capital ratios would be. The recovery in U.S. real estate markets and the stabilization of real estate prices, if not increases in these prices, have provided more certainty to banks about their future real estate write-downs. And, of course, any lender would prefer to extend credit backed by collateral that is rising in price than collateral that is declining in price. In addition, the regulatory environment for banks has become more certain. This, plus a massive capital-raising campaign by banks in recent years, puts banks in a position to step up their lending.

Has there been unrequited demand for credit from the household sector? I argue that there is reason to believe so. Chart 5 shows the household debt-service burden – required principal and interest payments on outstanding household debt as a percent of after-tax personal income. With the general decline in interest rates, the household debt-service burden has plunged to its lowest level since the early 1990s. So, in terms of monthly required principal and interest payments, households are able to take on more debt.

Chart 5


Would any household want to take out a home mortgage today? If not now, when? Chart 6 shows the historical “yield” on owner-occupied housing vs. the cost of financing a house, the mortgage rate. The yield on owner-occupied housing is obtained by dividing the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing by the market value of owner-occupied housing (and multiplying by 100 in order to put it into percentage terms). In Q3:2012, the yield on owner-occupied housing stood at 7.26% vs. an effective mortgage rate of 3.72%. So, in Q3:2012, assuming you could qualify for a mortgage, you could have acquired an asset with a current yield of 7.26% and financed that asset at a borrowing rate of 3.72%. Sounds like a good deal, right? This differential between the yield on housing and the mortgage rate in Q3:2012 was 3.54%, the widest positive differential in the history of the series. In fact, this differential turned positive in Q4:2008 and has been trending higher to its current record high. So, why was there not the beginning of a sustained recovery in home sales until 2011? Because, although housing has been an attractive purchase in the past three years, banks have been reluctant to extend new housing financing until mid 2011. As Chart 4 shows, combined Federal Reserve and bank credit resumed growth in early 2011, about the same time that home sales began trending higher. I do not think that it is any coincidence that another credit-sensitive sector of household spending has experienced a recovery since thin-air credit started growing again – motor vehicle sales.

Chart 6


Now, there could be some intermediate periods of “cloudiness” in the U.S. economy during 2013 due to federal budgetary issues. The federal budget deficit declined in 2012, as shown in Chart 7, and it will decline further in 2013. Of course, the budget deficit is a function of government outlays as well as receipts. Also shown in Chart 7 is the year-over-year percentage change in the 12-month moving total of federal outlays. For example, the last data point in Chart 7 is the percent change in the sum of total federal outlays in the 12 months ended December 2012 vs. the sum of total federal outlays for the 12 months ended December 2011. As one can see from examining Chart 7, growth in federal outlays soared in 2009 at the depth of the recession. Since the end of the recession, however, growth in federal outlays has been considerably more subdued. In fact, there have been a number of 12-month spans when federal outlays have contracted. There are two reasons for the more subdued growth in federal spending in the past three years. Firstly, with the recovery in the economy, albeit a weak recovery, growth in some income-maintenance programs, such as unemployment insurance benefit payments, has slowed. Secondly, Congress passed legislation in the summer of 2011 that called for a reduction in federal spending vs. plan of more than $1 trillion over the next 10 years. This congressional governor on spending played a key role in slowing federal –outlay growth in calendar 2012. Federal revenue growth rebounded with the recovery in the economy after the last recession. Both household and corporate tax receipts were boosted by the return of GDP growth.

Chart 7



Growth in federal spending is set to come under further restraint in 2013. The sequestration of $1.2 trillion of federal outlays over the next 10 years is scheduled to kick in this March. Even if the sequestration legislation is modified, there is a likelihood of a further significant restraint on federal spending. Revenues will be increasing due to the end of the payroll-tax “holiday,” the higher marginal tax rates on upper-income households and the increased taxes associated with the Affordable [health] Care Act. 

Will this combination of additional federal spending restraint and higher tax revenues have a material negative effect on growth in total domestic spending over the next year or so? Both theory and empirical evidence suggest it will not. The spending restraint and the higher tax revenues will result in a small federal deficit. By definition, this means that the federal government’s borrowing requirement will be less than otherwise. In turn, this implies that entities that otherwise would have been lending to the federal government will now find themselves with “excess” funds. There are three things these entities can do with these funds and two of them will offset spending reductions emanating from the restraint in federal-outlay growth or private-spending reductions emanating from the payment of higher taxes. One thing the entities with excess funds can do is lend these funds to households, businesses or other forms of government, who will then spend the funds. Alternatively, the entities with excess funds can spend the funds themselves. Lastly, the entities with excess funds can decide to simply hold them in the form of higher deposits. Only in this last case, where the demand for deposits rises, will there be no other spending to offset the reductions in spending emanating from the “tighter” fiscal policy.

That’s the theory as to why changes in fiscal policy have no material effect on total spending in the economy. Here’s the empirical evidence in Chart 8. The data in Chart 8 are the year-to-year percentage point changes in the budget stance of the federal government and year-to-year percent changes in nominal GDP. The changes in GDP are straightforward. But some explanation is in order for the changes in fiscal stance. The budgetary position of the federal government is affected by the behavior of the economy. When the economy is growing rapidly, tax revenues are boosted for a given tax-rate structure because household incomes and corporate profits are growing faster. Federal outlays tend to be more restrained when the economy is growing rapidly because income-maintenance expenditures, such as unemployment insurance benefit payments and food stamp expenditures grow more slowly. So, to test for the effect of changes in the budget situation on changes in GDP, the budget surplus/deficit needs to be adjusted for the cyclical effects on it just described.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) publishes a series that adjusts the federal budget surplus/deficit for these cyclical effects.  The CBO also calculates this cyclically-adjusted budget surplus/deficit as a percent of potential GDP in order to scale the budget concept. The red bars in Chart 8 represent the year-to-year percentage-point change in the cyclically-adjusted budget surplus/deficit as a percent of GDP. According to mainstream-media economics, a change in fiscal policy that would result in a larger budget surplus/smaller budget deficit  (the red bars in Chart 8 become more positive or less negative) should be associated with slower growth in nominal GDP and vice versa. That is, according to mainstream-media economics, there should be a negative relationship or correlation between changes in the fiscal policy variable in Chart 8 and changes in GDP. If changes in fiscal policy are compared with changes in GDP contemporaneously (not shown in Chart 8), the correlation turns out to be positive. That is, when looking at changes in the fiscal policy variable and changes in GDP in the same year, an increase in the budget surplus/decrease in the deficit tends to be associated with an increase in GDP growth. Well, to be fair to the mainstream-media economics, it is reasonable to expect that there would be some lag between a change in fiscal policy and its effect on GDP growth. In order to get the negative correlation between changes in fiscal policy and changes in GDP predicted by mainstream-media economics, changes in fiscal policy have to lead changes in GDP by two years (the “-2” in the “red” title in Chart 8). An absolute value of .02 for a correlation is close enough to zero “for government work.” In other words, the data suggest that there is no meaningful relationship between changes in fiscal policy and changes in GDP. To re-iterate, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, I do not believe that the likely ‘tightening” in federal fiscal policy in 2013 will have a materially negative effect on growth in U.S. total domestic demand on an annual basis.

Chart 8


What’s the economic outlook for the rest of the world? Let’s start with the Chinese economic outlook. I forecast “sunshine,” but perhaps not as relatively bright as that for the U.S. The Chinese economy overheated in 2009-2010 as result of a surge in Chinese depository-institution credit, i.e., thin-air credit (see Chart 9). As a result of the overheating, Chinese consumer inflation accelerated. In response to these developments, the Chinese monetary authority, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), took actions in 2010 and 2011 that pushed up short-term Chinese interest rates and slowed the growth in Chinese thin-air credit. As consumer inflation abated in 2012, the PBOC reversed policy, which resulted in a re-acceleration in Chinese thin-air credit growth. Although the PBOC is unlikely to countenance growth in Chinese thin-air credit as rapid as what occurred in 2009, I do expect that Chinese thin-air credit growth will be maintained at its current rate or a bit higher. This will result in a further re-acceleration in Chinese domestic-demand growth. A little-appreciated fact, but China is a huge importer of raw materials and semi-finished goods, such as electronic components. This implies that the expected acceleration in Chinese domestic-demand growth will stimulate growth in other economies via their export sectors.
Chart 9


One economy that will benefit from increased exports to China will be the Japanese economy. Japanese domestic demand is likely to receive a boost from Japanese monetary policy. The new Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, will name the new governor and two deputy governors of the Japanese central bank, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), in March. The new governor of the central bank is expected to implement a more aggressive accommodative monetary policy. Given that Japanese short-term interest rates are near zero, this more aggressive accommodative monetary policy would be expected to manifest itself by a faster expansion in the BOJ’s balance sheet. So, Japanese thin-air credit is set to grow faster in 2013. Regardless of the growth in thin-air credit, the Japanese economy’s potential real growth rate is not what it was 30 years ago because Japanese labor force is declining because of the rapid aging of the population. Any economy’s potential growth rate, be it Japanese or American, is dictated by the growth in its labor force and the growth in the productivity of its labor force. Unless Japanese labor productivity growth were to experience some extraordinary permanent boost, the contracting Japanese labor force will limit aggregate Japanese real economic growth. Of course, real Japanese per capita income could still grow as rapidly as it did 30 years ago. 
If there is a persistent cloud in the 2013 economic outlook, it hangs over Europe. The European banks have endured two major damaging “storms” since 2008. The first storm originated in the U.S. with the bursting of the American housing bubble and the failure of Lehman Brothers. The second storm to hit the European banks was spawned at home – the fiscal calamities of the southern European governments. Both storms reduced the capital of European banks, inhibiting their ability to create normal amounts of thin-air credit. Although the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken bold steps to supply liquidity to European banks in order to prevent their insolvency, the ECB has been unable due to political reasons and/ or unwilling due to a lack of understanding to expand its balance sheet so as to maintain a normal rate of growth in eurozone thin-air credit (see Chart 10). Unless the ECB decides to step up its provision of thin-air credit or eurozone depository institutions miraculously find the capital to expand their credit creation, the European economy as a whole will remain mired in a mild recession in 2013.
Chart 10


So, as CNBC’s Maria Bartiromo might ask, “How do I make money with all this?” Well, the expected acceleration in the growth of thin-air credit globally except for Europe will accelerate global spending on goods, service and assets. The acceleration in the growth of thin-air credit also will put a “whiff” of higher inflation in the global atmosphere. The implication of stronger global aggregate demand with the abatement of deflationary pressures is bullish for risk assets such as equities, “junk” bonds, real estate and commodities. It is bearish for assets with less credit risk such as investment grade corporate and government bonds. I believe that investment grade bonds in the U.S. are particularly at risk. If U.S. thin-air credit grows by 8% or more in 2013, which is quite likely given the Federal Reserve’s current rate of net securities acquisitions, then the U.S. unemployment rate is likely to fall faster and U.S. inflationary pressures are likely to build faster than the Federal Reserve currently is forecasting. This will bring forward in time expectations as to when the Federal Reserve will begin pushing up short-term interest rates.  Thus, the U.S. government securities yield curve will steepen in 2013 as bond yields rise with money-market interest rates still anchored by Federal Reserve policy. I believe that the Federal Reserve will start pushing up short-term interest rates in 2014, not 2015 as is generally expected, and, after a few “baby-step” interest rate increases, the Federal Reserve will then make some “giant-step” interest rate hikes. In other words, I believe the behavior of bond yields in 2014 will “rhyme” with, if not repeat, their 1994 behavior.
Paul L. Kasriel
Econtrarian, LLC
1-920-818-0236