August 24, 2015
Forget the Sept. ’15 Fed Tightening –
There Has Been a Stealth Tightening Since Sept. ’14!
The late, great Milton Friedman used to preach that you
don’t assess the degree of monetary policy restriction or accommodation by the
level and movement of interest rates but rather by the behavior of monetary quantities. For Friedman, the monetary
quantity by which he judged the stance of monetary policy was some definition
of the money supply – currency and some of the deposit liabilities of the
banking system. Meaning no disrespect to the greatest monetary theorist of the
20th century, but the monetary quantity I prefer to use to measure
the stance of monetary policy is on the asset side of the banking system’s
balance sheet -- the sum of banks’ cash
reserves provided by the central bank and
the loans and securities granted by the banking system. By my measure, the
Fed has been gradually tightening its monetary policy at least since September 2014. Moreover, in recent months, Fed monetary policy has become
downright restrictive.
This is illustrated in Chart 1. Plotted in Chart 1 is the
behavior of the sum of commercial bank credit – loans and securities held by
U.S. commercial banks -- and the cash assets held by these commercial banks –
largely banks’ cash reserves created by the Fed. Past readers of my
commentaries will recognize this monetary quantity as my concept (really
Austrian economists’ concept) of “thin-air credit”. I refer to it as thin-air
credit because cash reserves provided by the Fed are created, figuratively, out
of thin air and so, too, is commercial bank credit in the fractional-reserve
banking system that we have in the U.S. The red bars in Chart 1 represent the
month vs. year-ago month percent changes in this monetary quantity. The blue
line represents the three-month annualized percent changes in this monetary
quantity. To put things in an historical context, the median percent change in
the annual averages of this monetary quantity from 1975 through 2015 was 6.62%.
Chart 1
The year-over-year percent change in the sum of
commercial bank credit and cash assets peaked in July 2014 at 9.74% (the red
bar just to the left of the solid black vertical line in Chart 1). The Fed’s
third round of quantitative easing (QE), which had begun in September 2012 and
was terminated in October 2014, was still being phased down in July 2014. The
year-over-year percent change in this measure of thin-air credit has trended
lower since July 2014, slowing to only 4.45% as of July 2015. The more variable
three-month annualized growth in this measure of thin-air credit also has been
trending lower since July 2014, slowing to 1.25% as of July 2015. Against the
backdrop of a 40-year median growth rate of 6.62% for this measure of thin-air
credit, recent months’ growth rates in it are relatively low, implying that the Fed’s monetary policy has
gone from accommodative in July 2014 to
restrictive in July 2015.
Plotted in Chart 2 are the year-over-year percent changes
in the two components of this measure of thin-air credit – the cash assets held
by commercial banks, primarily cash reserves provided by the Fed, and loans and
securities held by commercial banks. This chart shows that key driver of the
slowdown in thin-air credit growth since July 2014 has been the slowing in cash
assets held by commercial banks, i.e., a slowdown in the Fed’s provision of
bank reserves. In each of the three months ended July 2015, commercial bank
cash assets have contracted vs. year
ago. Although commercial bank credit growth has slowed in recent months, it
nevertheless remained relatively robust in July 2015 at nearly 7% on a
year-over-year basis.
Chart 2
It stands to reason that growth in bank reserves would
slow as the Fed tapered and then ended its purchases of securities, the largest
source of reserve creation. But ending Fed securities purchases would not
necessarily result in a contraction
in bank reserves. But as Chart 3 shows, this is exactly what occurred. While
the year-over-year dollar change in Fed securities holdings has narrowed, the
year-over-year dollar change in bank reserves has actually contracted in six of
the past nine months.
Chart 3
Chart 4 shows that as the year-over-year dollar changes
in in the total supply of reserves, Fed security holdings plus other factors such
as Federal Reserve float, have become smaller since the Fed began phasing out
QE3, the year-over-year dollar changes in factors other than bank reserves absorbing the supply of bank reserves have
increased. Some of these absorbing factors such as currency demanded by the
public and Treasury deposits held at the Fed are beyond the Fed’s control. Back
in the pre-QE era, the Fed used to engage in what were termed “defensive” open
market operations to offset undesired absorption of reserves from these
uncontrollable factors.
Chart 4
But as shown in Chart 5, there have been some factors
absorbing the supply of reserves under
the Fed’s control that have been increasing. These two reserve-absorbing
factors controlled by the Fed are reverse repurchase agreements with government
securities dealers and money funds and term deposits offered to commercial
banks and other depository institutions. For reasons known only to it, the Fed
began “experimenting” with these reserve-absorbing operations early in 2014 as
it began tapering its reserve-supplying securities purchases. The Fed then
stepped up its reserve-absorbing operations from October 2014 through February
2015, after it had ceased its QE
securities purchases. Go figure.
Chart 5
The upshot of all this is that from a monetary quantity perspective, monetary policy
has tightened significantly from a year ago. Growth in the credit being created
by the private banking system has returned to near its long-run median rate
after having been severely constrained during and after the 2008 financial
crisis. But total thin-air credit
growth is below its long-run median rate because of the slow growth or
contraction in the Fed’s contribution. In my opinion, the Fed was correct in
phasing down its securities purchases when it commenced to do so. Growth in
total thin-air credit was excessive at that time. But without the Fed having
any clear understanding of how many securities to purchase when it commenced
its three QE programs, it had no idea of by how much it should taper its
securities purchases. The Fed’s management of securities purchases and reserves
growth needs to be guided by what was happening to growth in total thin-air credit – banks’
contribution and the Fed’s. There is
absolutely no evidence that the Fed has been guided by this. As a result,
monetary policy has gone from one extreme – overly accommodative – to the other
– overly restrictive. The more things change, the more they stay the same.
Now, let’s talk about something important – the recent
swoon in the U.S. stock market. Plotted
in Chart 6 are the year-over-year percent changes in monthly observations of
the Wilshire 5000 stock market along with year-over-year percent changes in
monthly observations of thin-air credit. Although growth in the Wilshire 5000
peaked about six months before
thin-air credit growth peaked, the peak in the Wilshire 5000 growth occurred
around the time the Fed began tapering its securities purchases. To the degree
that financial markets anticipate
events, it is conceivable that the stock market movers and shakers anticipated
that the Fed’s phasing out of its securities purchases would eventually have an
adverse effect on stock market values.
Chart 6
After massive purchases of securities by the Fed, why
might the cessation of these purchases have an adverse effect on stock market
values? When the Fed purchases securities, the sellers are government
securities dealers. Dealers do not hold the quantities of securities that the
Fed was purchasing during QE, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. In
order to accommodate the Fed’s demand for securities, dealers bid for
securities that their customers held. Dealers’ customers are large
institutions, e.g., pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and
banks. The dealer community was an intermediary between the Fed and large
financial institutions. So, when the Fed purchased securities, ultimately,
large financial institutions sold securities and received cash. It is unlikely
that these large financial institutions were to content to give up an earning asset
for cash that has no explicit nominal return. Rather, these large financial
institutions used the cash it received indirectly from the Fed, cash created
figuratively out of thin air, to purchase other earning financial assets. Some
of these assets purchased by large financial assets might have been equities.
Some of these assets might have been bonds issued by corporations for the
express purpose of financing their share buybacks. The Fed’s creation of
thin-air credit likely financed, directly or indirectly, increased purchases of
riskier financial assets, which, in turn, boosted the prices of these riskier
assets. If so, then the Fed’s cessation of securities purchases and contraction
in its contribution to thin-air credit would reduce the demand for riskier
assets, which would have an adverse effect on their prices. So, why did I wait
until now, after the recent swoon in the stock market, to tell you that the
Fed’s cessation of QE would have an adverse effect on the stock market? Well,
truth be told, I did alert you to this probability back on November 17, 2014,
in a commentary entitled “2015 Is
Shaping Up to Be a ‘Turkey’ of a Year for the U.S. Economy and Stock Market”.
But the truth also be told, I had no idea that a stock
market swoon would occur in August 2015. In fact, I had no idea a stock market
swoon would occur at any time in 2015. But it did appear to me back in November
2014 that thin-air credit growth was likely to decelerate sharply in 2015
compared to 2014. And that a sharp deceleration in thin-air credit growth would
have adverse effects on nominal aggregate demand and the value of risk assets.
The adverse effect on the value of risk assets appears to be upon us. Of
course, the collapse of the Chinese stock market has played a large role in the
decline in prices of U.S. risk assets, perhaps a larger role than the sharp
deceleration in U.S. thin-air credit. Weather-adjusted, U.S. aggregate demand
has held up relatively well. I suspect that will change in the fourth quarter
of this year.
In the face of very low goods/services price inflation
and weak wage growth, the recent U.S. stock market rout is likely to postpone
the previously-anticipated September 2015 Fed rate hike. It is too early to
expect QE4. But the Fed certainly has the leeway to restart securities
purchases if need be. In other words, take some comfort in a Yellen put.
Paul L. Kasriel
Econtrarian, LLC
Senior Economic and Investment Advisor
Legacy Private Trust Co. of Neenah, WI
1-920-818-0236
Great post as always!
ReplyDeleteRegarding reserve-absorption operations, I believe I have read somewhere that the Fed was experimenting with those in order to be able, if and when the time would come, to reduce its balance sheet without having to dump bonds outright on the market.
I am also wondering about the effect on the Fed balance sheet from maturing securities and interest received.
From bubble (2000) to bubble (2007) to (QE) bubble (2015):
ReplyDeletehttps://pbs.twimg.com/media/CNLv-VRUsAEfV5w.png:large
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/charts/valuation/Buffett-Indicator.gif
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/charts/guest/2014/LR-140417-Fig-3.png
I'm still flabbergasted and puzzled by the radical, 180 degrees change in P. Kasriel's attitude towards those bubbles though.
1. P. Kasriel anno 2001:
Greenspan is, through his monetary policy actions or in-actions, responsible for the stock market bubble.
"But whether or not Chairman Greenspan was a cheerleader for the new-era notion and, implicitly, a cheerleader for the high stock market valuations is small potatoes compared to his aiding and abetting the creation of the bubble through his monetary policy actions, or in-actions, as the case may be. He could have done all the sideline cheering he wanted and there would not have been a bubble had he not created all of the cheap credit that is a necessary condition for the inflation of an asset bubble."
http://www.northerntrust.com/library/econ_research/weekly/us/010831.html
2. P. Kasriel (2014, 18 October):
QE stimulates spending (rather than asset bubbles):
"When central banks purchase securities in the open market, such as they do when they engage in quantitative easing (QE), they create credit out of thin air. When the depository institution system expands its loan and securities portfolios, it creates credit out of thin air. Credit created out of thin air enables the borrower to increase his/her current nominal spending while not requiring any other entity to reduce its current spending."
http://the-econtrarian.blogspot.be/2014/10/a-tale-of-two-economies-it-was-better.html
3. P. Kasriel (2015, 16 July):
There is, therefore, after three rounds of QE and one of the longest (non-secular) bull markets in history, no asset bubble in sight:
"This current below “normal” growth in the largest component of thin-air credit implies that the dangers of a near-term overheated economic environment and/or inflation of an asset-price bubble are low."
"And asset prices are not racing to the moon (See Chart 6)."
4. P. Kasriel (2015, 24 August):
QE does, all of a sudden, not stimulate spending but rather the purchase of risky assets and I told you that the end of QE might, therefore, have "an adverse effect on the stock market" (or rather, in P. Kasriel 2001 lingo: pop the QE bubble).
"So, when the Fed purchased securities, ultimately, large financial institutions sold securities and received cash. It is unlikely that these large financial institutions were to content to give up an earning asset for cash that has no explicit nominal return. Rather, these large financial institutions used the cash it received indirectly from the Fed, cash created figuratively out of thin air, to purchase other earning financial assets."
"If so, then the Fed’s cessation of securities purchases and contraction in its contribution to thin-air credit would reduce the demand for riskier assets, which would have an adverse effect on their prices. So, why did I wait until now, after the recent swoon in the stock market, to tell you that the Fed’s cessation of QE would have an adverse effect on the stock market? Well, truth be told, I did alert you to this probability back on November 17, 2014, in a commentary entitled “2015 Is Shaping Up to Be a ‘Turkey’ of a Year for the U.S. Economy and Stock Market”."
Very insightful. The dips in real M0 have coincided with the tail ends of QE 1,2, and now 3. Indeed, the most reading is negative. This appears to also be consistent with the collapse in breakeven inflation expectations. Do you think that the stance of MP has become unintentionally tighter?
ReplyDeleteWith regards to the overnight repo experiments. Due to the quarks of the FF market and the rules of IOER, the EFF has remained below IOER. Basically, not every participant in the FF market is eligible to earn IOER. In order to correct for this, the FED established the repo program so that these entities (mainly FHLBs) can have an opportunity to earn risk-free interest overnight. What has occurred is that the IOER has served as soft ceiling for the EFF and the overnight repo as the floor. The FED began experimenting to check what impact it would have on markets should they begin to employ it as a tool (it looks like they will).
I am a little confused by this configuration of MP, because the opportunity cost of holding M0 becomes negative if the IOER is higher than the market rate (say 3 month t-bills). I wonder if this will have an impact on the effect of MP has on the economy. Do you have any thoughts on this?
Paul writes:
ReplyDelete"So, when the Fed purchased securities, ultimately, large financial institutions sold securities and received cash."
Really? Has the quantity of "securities" (Treasury- & mortgage-backed-bonds?) owned by "large financial institutions" declined as a result of the Fed's purchases?
If so, I'd be surprised. But in any case, your assertion sounds like something empirically verifiable—or why else would you assert it?
So, my question is: What's the empirical evidence for your belief that "when the Fed purchased securities . . . large financial institutions sold securities and received cash."
(You may define "large financial institutions" and "securities" any way you wish.)